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Abstract 
 
This paper presents an extended strategy for the analysis of complex fault trees. The 
method utilises simplification rules, which are applied to the fault tree to reduce it to a 
series of smaller subtrees, whose solution is equivalent to the original fault tree. The 
smaller subtree units are less sensitive to the basic event ordering during BDD 
conversion. BDDs are constructed for every subtree. Qualitative analysis is performed 
on the set of BDDs to obtain the prime implicant sets for the original top event. It is 
shown how to extract the prime implicant sets from complex and modular events in 
order to obtain the prime implicant sets of the original fault tree in terms of basic 
events.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Fault tree analysis was first conceived in the 1960's and provides a good 
representation of the system from an engineering viewpoint. This form of the failure 
logic function does not however lend itself to easy and accurate mathematical 
manipulation. A more convenient form for the logic function from the mathematical 
viewpoint is that of a Binary Decision Diagram [1,2]. It overcomes some 
disadvantages of conventional FTA techniques enabling efficient and exact qualitative 
and  quantitative analyses of both coherent and non-coherent fault trees. 
 
The difficulty of the BDD method is with the conversion process of the fault tree to 
the BDD. An aspect of this is that the basic events in the fault tree have to be placed 
in an ordering required to construct the BDD. A good ordering gives a concise BDD 
form. A bad ordering may lead to an explosion in the size of the BDD used to 
represent the fault tree. To date an optimum strategy for producing BDDs for all fault 
trees has not been identified. 
 
Non-coherency introduces difficulties in the qualitative assessment of the fault tree 
compared with the coherent version. The failure modes of the system, combinations 
of working or failed components which result in system failure, tend to be greater in 
number and larger in order than the coherent version. This can render the qualitative 
evaluation intractable. The BDD method is more efficient for analysing a system 
without the need for the approximations used in the traditional approach of kinetic 
tree theory [3]. 
 
In this paper two simplification strategies that have been shown to be effective in 
reducing the complexity of the problem are applied: reduction [4] and modularisation 
[5]. The reduction technique simplifies the fault tree to its minimal logic form, whilst  
modularisation breaks down the fault tree to independent subtrees that can be 
analysed separately.  
 
Then BDDs are obtained for each module in separate computations, culminating in a 
set of BDDs, which together represent the original system failure diagram. A 
qualitative analysis of non-coherent fault trees using BDDs is the subject of this 
paper. Meta-products BDDs [6,7] used to determine the prime implicant sets are then 
developed. Then prime implicant sets for every module can be calculated and 
extracted for the whole system. Each of these stages is described in detail in the 
following sections and demonstrated throughout by the use of an example. 
 
2. Non-coherent fault tree structure 
 
In a coherent fault tree each component in the system is relevant, and the structure 
function is monotonically increasing [8]. A fault tree that contains only AND gates 
and OR gates is always coherent. Whenever a NOT logic gate is introduced into a 
fault tree, it is likely to become non-coherent. A fault tree is non-coherent when both 
component failure and working states (positive and negative events) contribute cause 
of the top event. For example, system failure might occur due to the recovery of a 
failed component. Alternatively, during system failure, the failure of an additional 
component may bring the system to a good state.  
 
Consider an example of the traffic light system [8] shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Traffic light system 
 
Cars A and B are approaching the lights on RED and should stop. Car C is 
approaching the junction with lights on GREEN and should proceed. Given this 
scenario, the following failure events can occur: 
 A - Car A fails to stop  
 B - Car B fails to stop  
 C - Car C fails to continue  
An accident at this crossroads can occur in two ways: 
 Car A acts properly and stops ( A ) and car B fails to stop (B) and drives into 
the back of A.  
 Car A fails to stop (A) and if car C continues to move into the crossing ( C ), A 
hits C.  
The fault tree to represent the causes of an accident situation at this crossroads is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Fault tree for traffic light system 
 
Working in a top-down way the following logic expression is obtained, which is in 
disjunctive normal form (minimal sum of products)  
BACATop  . (1) 
where “+” is OR, “·” is AND. 
A qualitative analysis of the non-coherent fault tree will produce the system failure 
modes known as prime implicant sets. Prime implicants are defined as combinations 
of component conditions (working or failed) which are necessary and sufficient to 
cause system failure. Taking the produced terms from equation 1 gives prime 
implicant sets  CA  and  BA . 
 
However, unlike the reduction of the logic expression for a coherent fault tree the 
logic equation for the top event in the non-coherent case does not produce a complete 
list of all prime implicants. In this example, if car B fails to stop and car C continues 
across the lights there will be a collision whatever A does. Therefore, the full logic 
expression for the Top event is: 
CBBACATop  , (2) 
which can be obtained by applying the consensus law: 
YXYAXAYAXA  . (3) 
This example is included just as a means to demonstrate issues for non-coherent fault 
trees. The increase in length of the logic equation for non-coherent fault trees can 
cause difficulties for large fault trees and is at times necessary [8]. The inclusion of 
NOT logic gates is used in Event Tree Analysis where there are component failures 
that occur in more than one fault tree which represent the causes of the branching [9]. 
Also, NOT logic is important in Phased Mission Analysis [10].  
 
It is possible to reduce the prime implicant sets to their coherent approximations prior 
to the fault tree quantification. This is achieved by removing all success states and re-
minimising the expression (on the basis of likelihood is close to 1). This will give 
minimal cut sets {A} and {B}. 
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 3. Simplification of the fault tree structure 
 
Dealing with complex industrial systems can result in very large fault trees, whose 
analysis is time consuming. Two pre-processing techniques can be applied to the fault 
tree in order to obtain the smallest possible subtrees and reduce the size of the 
problem. The first part of the simplification process is a reduction technique [4] which 
resizes the fault tree to its simplest form. The second part identifies independent 
modules (subtrees) within the fault tree that can be dealt with separately [5]. The 
linear-time algorithm is applied to the second part and a set of independent fault trees 
in their simplest possible structure is obtained. It is equivalent to the original system 
failure causes and is easier to manipulate during the analysis process.  
 
The analysis strategy of coherent fault trees incorporating the simplification process 
was presented in [11]. This paper provides a development of this technique in the 
non-coherent case.  
 
3.1. Reduction 
 
This technique reduces the fault tree to its simplest form while retaining its logical 
structure. It is applied in four stages:  
 contraction,  
 factorisation,  
 extraction,  
 absorption.  
 
First of all, the fault tree is manipulated so that the NOT logic is “pushed” down the 
fault tree until it is applied to basic events using De Morgan’s laws, i.e. 
BABA   (4) 
BABA   (5) 
Then for the contraction, subsequent gates of the same type are contracted to form a 
single gate so that the fault tree becomes an alternating sequence of AND and OR 
gates.  
 
During the factorisation,  pairs of events that always occur together as inputs to the 
same gate type are identified and combined forming a single complex event. If events 
appear in their working and failed states in the fault tree, only those basic events that 
appear together in their negated state under the opposite gate type can be combined. 
(Note: in this sense the “AND” type gate is opposite to the “OR” type gate). By De 
Morgan’s equations 4 and 5, if ba   and/or ba   appear in the fault tree, then ba   
forms a complex event, or if ba   and/or ba   appear in the fault tree, then ba   
forms a complex event. The complex events identified are then substituted into the 
fault tree structure. 
 
In the extraction stage, the two structures shown in Figure 3 are identified and 
replaced in order to reduce the repeated occurrence of events to a single occurrence 
and facilitate further reduction.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Reduction, the extraction procedure 
 
If another component is repeated in the structure and it is repeated in its negated state, 
the structures shown in Figure 4 can be simplified even more, i.e. the whole structure 
is replaced by the component that appears only in one state, failed or working.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Reduction, the extraction procedure in non-coherent case 
 
During absorption, structures were identified that could be further simplified through 
the application of the absorption and idempotent laws to the fault tree logic. The 
simplification process can be applied when an event is repeated in the branch of the 
fault tree structure. The gate with the first occurrence of the repeated event is called a 
primary gate and a gate with the second occurrence of the repeated event is called a 
secondary gate. There can be two types of the repetition in a non-coherent system, i.e. 
a component can be repeated in the same state or it can be repeated in its negated 
state.  
 
Considering the first case, if the primary and the secondary gates with an event in 
common are of different type (Figure 5(i)), the structure is simplified by removing the 
whole secondary gate and its descendants. If the primary and the secondary gates are 
of the same type (Figure 5(ii)), the structure is simplified by deleting the occurrence 
of the event beneath the secondary gate.  
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Figure 5. Reduction, the absorption procedure 
 
If a component is repeated in its negated state, the absorption rule can again be 
applied. In this case the absorption cannot be applied if the primary gate is an OR 
gate. Therefore, if the primary gate is an AND gate and the secondary gate is an OR 
gate (Figure 6(i)), then the structure is simplified by deleting the occurrence of the 
event beneath the secondary gate. If both the primary gate and the secondary gate are 
AND gates (Figure 6(ii)), the whole secondary gate can be deleted. The order of 
appearance of positive and negative events in primary and secondary gates is 
irrelevant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Reduction, the absorption procedure in non-coherent case 
 
The above four steps are repeated until no further changes take place in the fault tree. 
An example of the application of these rules to a fault tree is demonstrated 
considering the fault tree shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Example fault tree 
 
 
 
    
  Figure 8. Reduced fault tree 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Reduced fault tree 2 
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Contraction was performed for gates G1 and G3, which are of the same type, forming 
a single gate. Factorisation was performed three times: for the pair of basic events a 
AND b for the pair of basic event c OR d and for the pair of basic events e AND h, 
creating complex events 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively. Basic events e  OR h  
form complex event 2002 . The corresponding complex event data are shown in Table 
1. The extraction procedure was applied to gates G4 and G5, extracting the repeated 
event f. The simplified fault tree is shown in Figure 8. Finally, the absorption was 
applied to gate G2 removing gate G5. No further simplification is possible. The final 
reduced tree is shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The complex event data 
 
Reduction has simplified the example fault tree. In the original tree there were six 
gates, in the reduced tree there are 3 gates. There were thirteen events in the original 
fault tree, eight of them different; in the reduced tree there are five events, and four of 
them are different. For large systems the degree of simplification is far more 
significant.  
 
Having reduced the fault tree to a more concise form, the second pre-processing 
technique of modularisation is considered. 
 
3.2. Modularisation 
 
The modularisation technique identifies independent subtrees within the fault tree. 
Every module contains no basic events that appear elsewhere in the fault tree and it 
can be analysed separately. The results from each module are substituted into the 
higher level fault trees where modules occur and further stages of the analysis are 
performed.  
 
For the purposes of the process basic events in their positive or negative form are 
considered as the same entity as it is only the vent label that is important in 
identifying independent modules. Using the linear-time algorithm [5] the independent 
modules can be identified after just two depth-first traversals of the fault tree. During 
the first time of the traversal the step number at the first, second and final visits to 
every node (gate and event) is recorded. Then the maximum (Max) of the last visits 
and the minimum (Min) of the first visits of the descendants (any gates or events 
appearing below that gate) of each gate are calculated. Step numbers for every node in 
the example fault tree, Max and Min of the gates and events for the reduced tree in 
Figure 9 are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
Complex 
event 
Gate value Event 1 Event 2 
2000 AND a b 
2001 OR c d 
2002 AND e h 
 Step 
number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Node Top 2000 G1 2001 2002  G2 2002 f G2 G1 Top 
 
Table 2. Step numbers for every node in the fault tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Data for gates in the fault tree   Table 4. Data for events in the fault tree 
 
The rules for identifying a gate as heading a module are: 
 The first visit to each descendant of a gate is after the first visit to the gate and 
 The last visit to each descendant of a gate is before the second visit to the gate.  
 
The following gates can be identified as heading modules: 
Top, G1. 
Gate G2 can not be a module because one its descendant (event 2002) is visited 
before visiting parent gate. 
 
Gate G1 is replaced by modular event M1. Two separate fault trees, shown in Figure 
10, now replace the fault tree in Figure 9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The two modules obtained for the fault tree shown in Figure 9 
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Having reduced the fault tree to its minimal form and identified all the independent 
modules the next stage is to obtain the BDDs. 
 
4. Conversion to binary decision diagrams  
 
Every independent fault tree is converted to a BDD. The variable ordering needs to be 
established before the conversion process. In this paper the variable ordering scheme 
for every module is set to be left-right top-down. For examples as small as these the 
variable ordering is largely irrelevant. Following the chosen scheme gives the 
orderings of basic events:  
Top: 2000 < M1, 
M1: 2001 < 2002 < f, 
The BDD construction algorithm is described in reference [2]. The resulting SFBDD  
encodes the structure function of a non-coherent fault tree. The background of it is to 
assign an ordered triple to each node in the SFBDD: 
ite(x,f1,f0), (6) 
here x is the Boolean variable representing a basic event as the node and f1 and f0 are 
the logic functions on its 1 branch and 0 branch respectively. ite is described as if-
then-else operation, i.e. 
If x occurs 
 then consider f1, 
 else consider f0. 
endif  
SFBDD construction then moves through the fault tree in a bottom-up manner. Basic 
events are assigned ite structures. For example, a basic event a is expressed as: 
a = ite(a,1,0). (7) 
Alternatively, a basic event a  is assigned an ite structure: 
a = ite(a,0,1). (8) 
When dealing with gates their input events, J and H, are expressed in the ite form, the 
following rules are applied: 
If J = ite(x,f1, f0) and H = ite(y,g1, g0), 
then 

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(9) 
Applying these rules to the fault tree in Figure 10 results in the set of SFBDDs 
presented in Figure 11. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The obtained SFBDDs for the modules shown in Figure 10 
 
The qualitative and quantitative analyses can be carried out since the complete set of 
SFBDDs have been computed. Now the calculation of prime implicant sets will be 
presented using the SFBDDs obtained from simplified fault trees. 
 
5. Calculation of prime implicant sets 
 
Knowledge of prime implicant sets can be valuable in gaining an understanding of the 
system. It can also help to develop a repair schedule for failed components if a system 
cannot be taken off line for repair. The SFBDD which encodes the structure function 
cannot be used directly to produce the complete list of prime implicant sets of a non-
coherent fault tree. For example, consider a general component x in a non-coherent 
system. Component x can be in a failed or working state, or can be excluded from the 
failure mode. In the first two situations x is said to be relevant, in the third case it is 
irrelevant to the system state. Component x can be either failure relevant (the prime 
implicant set contains x) or repair relevant (the prime implicant set contains x ). A 
general node in the SFBDD, which represents component x, has two branches. The 1 
branch corresponds to the failure of x; therefore, x is either failure relevant or 
irrelevant. Similarly, the 0 branch corresponds to the functioning of x and so x is 
either repair relevant or irrelevant. Hence it is impossible to distinguish between the 
two cases for each branch and the prime implicant sets cannot be identified from the 
SFBDD. 
 
There is a number of techniques developed for calculating prime implicant sets. The 
first approach was presented by Courdet and Madre [6] and further developed by 
Dutuit and Rauzy [7] where a meta-products BDD is formed. This technique is used 
in the paper. Some other alternative techniques for calculating prime implicant sets 
were presented by Sasao in [12], by Rauzy in [13] and by Contini in [14]. They use 
alternative notations for the representation of prime implicants.  
 
In meta-products BDD method developed an alternative notation is developed that 
associates two variables with every component x. The first variable, Px, denotes 
relevancy and the second variable, Sx, denotes the type of relevancy, i.e. failure or 
repair relevant. A meta-product, MP(π), is the intersection of all the system 
components according to their relevancy to the system state and π represents the 
prime implicant set encoded in meta-product MP(π). 
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The proposed algorithm is used for calculating the meta-products BDD of a fault tree 
from the SFBDD. The meta-products BDD is always minimal, therefore it encodes 
the prime implicant sets exactly.  
 
In order to present the algorithm, consider node F in a SFBDD, where F = ite(x, F1, 
F0). The meta-products BDD, that describes prime implicant sets using equation 12, 
is expressed as: 
PI(F) = ite(Px, ite(Sx, P1, P0), P2), (11) 
where  
P2 = PI(F1·F0), (12) 
P1 = PI(F1) · 2P , (13) 
P0 = PI(F0) · 2P . (14) 
x is the first element in the variable ordering, PI(F) represents the structure of a meta-
products BDD. 
 
P2 encodes the prime implicants for which x is irrelevant, P1 encodes the prime 
implicants for which x is failure relevant and P0 encodes the prime implicants for 
which x is repair relevant. 
 
If not all the basic events in the variable ordering appear on the particular path, then 
PI(F) = ite(
jx
P , 0, PI(F)).  (15) 
here xj is before xi  and xj does not appear on the current path from the root node to 
node F. 
 
If F is a terminal node, then 
PI(0) = 0, (16) 
PI(1) = ite(
ix
P , 0, ite(
1ix
P , 0,…, ite(
nx
P , 0, 1))).  (17) 
where xi, …, xn are basic events from the variable ordering that have not yet been 
considered in the process. 
 
*** 
 
Consider the BDD for Top module in Figure 11. Applying equations 11-14 to node F1 
gives: 
PI(F1) = ite(P2000, ite(S2000, PI(F2) · 1, PI(0) · 1), PI(F2 · 0)) = ite(P2000, ite(S2000, 
PI(F2), 0), 0). 
In the same way applying equations 11-14 to node F2 gives: 
PI(F2) = ite(PM1, ite(SM1, 1, 0), 0)). 
The meta-products BDD is obtained for Top module.  
 
Then the BDD for module M1 is investigated. Applying equation 13 to node F3 gives: 
PI(F3) = ite(P2001, ite(S2001, PI(1) ·  4FPI , PI(F4) ·  4FPI , PI(F4)). 
First of all, PI(1) is calculated. Since there are two more variables in the ordering 
scheme that were not investigated yet, i.e. 2002 < f, according to equation 17 we get: 
PI(1) = ite(P2002, 0, ite(Pf, 0, 1)).  
Then PI(F4) is calculated applying equations 11-14: 
PI(F4) = ite(P2002, ite(S2002, PI(F5) ·  5FPI , PI(1) ·  5FPI , PI(F5)). 
PI(1) is calculated in the same. Since there is only one variable left in the ordering 
scheme, i.e. variable  f, according to equation 17 it gives: 
PI(1) = ite(Pf, 0, 1).  
PI(F5) is obtained applying equations 11-14 to node F5. i.e. 
PI(F5) = ite(Pf, ite(Sf, 1, 0), 0). 
During the negation of PI(F5) terminal vertices 1 and vertices 0 are swapped in the 
meta-products BDD. Therefore,   
 5FPI  = ite(Pf, ite(Sf, 0, 1), 1). 
Since there are no repeated parts between PI(1) and  5FPI ,  
PI(1) ·  5FPI = PI(1). 
Then the calculation of PI(F4) is completed: 
PI(F4) = ite(P2002, ite(S2002, 0, ite(Pf, 0, 1)), ite(Pf, ite(Sf, 1, 0), 0)). 
 4FPI  is obtained in the same way, swapping terminal vertices 1 and 0. Because 
there are no repeated parts between PI(1) and  4FPI ,  
PI(1) ·  4FPI = PI(1). 
This assures that the meta-products BDD produced is in its minimal form. The 
calculation of the meta-products BDD for module M1 is completed. The set of 
resulting meta-products BDDs for two fault trees in Figure 11 is shown in Figure 12. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Meta-products BDDs for calculating prime implicant sets 
 
Now it is possible to obtain the meta-products and identify the prime implicant sets.  
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For example, in the second meta-product P2001 signifies that component 2001 is 
relevant and S2001 signifies that component 2001 is failure relevant. 2002P  and fP  
mean that components 2002 and f are irrelevant. Hence the prime implicant obtained 
is {2001}.  
 
The prime implicant sets have been produced for every independent module, that 
contain modular and complex events. It is essential to be able to analyse the system in 
terms of its original components, therefore, the next stage of the qualitative analysis 
has to consider the extraction of the combinations of component failures from every 
complex and modular event. 
 
A key point of the expansion algorithm, which is the same as the MOCUS method 
[15] for calculating minimal cut sets from fault trees, is that an AND gate increases 
the number of basic events in each prime implicant set and an OR gate increases the 
number of prime implicant sets in the system. A two dimensional array is created. 
Each line in the array represents a prime implicant set. At the start the top event gate 
is located in the first row and the first column of the two-dimensional array. Then 
repeatedly the array is scanned replacing: 
1. Each complex event which is an OR gate by a vertical expansion including 
the input events to the gate (duplicating all other events in this row) 
2. Each complex event which is an AND gate by a horizontal expansion 
including the input events to the gate 
3. Each modular event (original or negated) by a vertical and/or horizontal 
expansion including the list of prime implicant sets obtained from the 
meta-products BDD, which represents the modular event (original or 
negated 
until only basic events appear in the array.  
 
If prime implicant sets need to be produced for the negated modular event, the 
original BDD for this event need to be negated, replacing its terminal vertices 1 to 
vertices 0 and the other way round. Then the meta-products BDD for the negated 
modular event can be computed using the algorithm presented in references [6,7]. 
 
Calculation of prime implicant sets using this algorithm was performed and shown in 
Figure 13. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Extracting prime implicant sets from modular and complex events 
 
First module – Top – has produced one prime implicant set 
{2000, M1}, 
which replace the top event in the array, as shown in Figure 13(ii). Since complex 
event 2000 = a AND b, its inputs a and b replace the gate in a horizontal expansion. 
The obtained array is shown in Figure 13(iii). Also, module M1 can be replaced. M1 
produces three prime implicant set 
{2001}, { 2002 }, {f}. 
This set results in a vertical expansion in the array. The resulting array is shown in 
Figure 13(iv).  
 
Then the expansion of the inputs for complex event 2001 and event 2002  give two 
more horizontal expansions, shown in Figure 13(v).  
 
The prime implicant sets in the array contain only basic events, therefore the 
calculation is finished. The prime implicant sets of the example fault tree, presented in 
Figure 7 are: 
{a,b,c}, {a,b,d}, {a,b, h }, {a,b, e }, {a,b,f}. 
 
6. Comparison of qualitative analyses using original and simplified fault trees 
 
An analysis has been conducted on the fault tree to BDD conversion process. In this 
analysis some example fault trees were converted to BDDs and then qualitative 
analysis performed. Sixteen example fault trees were analysed by applying the BDD 
method to both the original and the simplified fault trees. Table 5 provides a summary 
of the results for each fault tree.  
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1 13 46 23 5 1188 81155 41310 0.172 66.86 
2 17 58 39 1 5303 172219 42318 0.64 434.782 
3 17 63 35 1 13738 105184 53217 1.828 109.729 
4 15 69 44 1 31824 594918 1357 7.562 1573.391 
5 21 16 1 1 11281 14769 20 0.687 0.938 
6 27 20 2 1 4452 17459 38 0.172 1.609 
7 39 27 1 1 43300 66166 105 8.25 19.734 
8 27 61 31 1 50765 - 373 9.219 - 
9 32 66 19 1 66406 - 67 18.421 - 
10 22 55 27 1 10583 683695 339 0.859 4130.425 
11 26 48 8 1 94827 336024 47 33.295 630.488 
12 32 38 4 1 13656 30671 50 0.844 3.297 
13 27 57 28 1 31123 533913 203 4.421 1796.779 
14 21 29 13 1 13464 109767 46 1.063 61.653 
15 25 41 17 1 10270 77215 74 0.547 18.921 
16 20 35 9 1 34633 134464 64 6.64 99.027 
 
Table 5. Calculation results for example fault trees 
 
The second and the third columns give some indications of the complexity of the 
example fault trees, presenting the number of gates and basic events.  
 
The results of the two simplification techniques are shown in the fourth and fifth 
columns, which represent the number of complex and modular events respectively. 
The reduction technique has reduced the size of the problem remarkably, especially 
for examples 2, 3 and 4. The modularisation technique extracted five independent 
modules for example 1. No more modules were extracted for other examples since the 
complex factors had already reduced the tree structure to its most efficient form. 
 
The sixth and seventh columns show the number of nodes in BDDs, which were 
obtained using the simplified and the original fault tree data respectively. A sum of 
number of nodes in SFBDDs and meta-products BDDs is examined since both types 
of BDDs are used in the qualitative analysis of non-coherent fault trees. The 
simplification procedure decreased the size of the BDDs significantly. 
 
The number of nodes decreased by approximately one half at least when the 
simplification rules on the fault trees were applied. Extraction of modules and 
complex events had a crucial effect on the biggest trees (examples 8 and 9) because it 
enabled the conversion process of fault trees to BDDs, whereas due to the size of the 
BDDs, the process failed if the original fault tree structures were used. BDDs could 
not be formed in the memory resources available.   
 
The eighth column represents the number of prime implicant sets in the solution. This 
again indicates the complexity of the problem. The last two columns respectively give 
the time taken to perform the analysis if simplified and original fault trees were used. 
The time decreased when simplification rules were applied because smaller BDDs 
were obtained. Since the conversion process for example 8 and 9 failed, the entries  
for the time are not reported because analysis was unable to be performed.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents a procedure by which large fault trees can be simplified prior to 
conversion to their Binary Decision Diagram form for analysis. Non-coherent fault 
trees are examined. Simplification is performed in two phases, the first reduces the 
fault tree to its more concise form and retains the underlying problem structure. The 
second phase identifies independent modules which can be analysed separately. In 
doing this the problem can be solved efficiently. Having performed the simplification 
the problem is solved in terms of the new modular structure and complex events. A 
means of calculating prime implicant sets in terms of the original basic events is 
presented. The efficiency of the simplification process is analysed using some 
example fault trees and it is compared with the analysis of fault trees that were not 
simplified. A comparison of two methods illustrates a favourable degree of efficiency 
in the simplification of fault trees prior to conversion to their BDD form for analysis. 
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